Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (2025)

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part I

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (1)

Image 1: TheSu-35 can accommodate a maximum of 17,637 pounds (8,000 kg) of ordinancemounted on 12 external hardpoints. The Su-35 will be armed with three principalair-to-air missiles (AAMs): the R-27, R-73, and R-77. Note: various Russiansources claim the long-range R-37 will be integrated with the Su-35, but nolive fire tests of the R-37 from the Su-35 have been documented at this time. ImageCredit: Sukhoi.

R-27/AA-10 Alamo

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (2)


Image 2:R-27 variants. Image Credit: Artem Company.

The R-27 isa highly modular beyond visual range (BVR) missile family designed by Vympel–nowthe Tactical Missiles Corporation–during the late 1970s for use on the Mig-29and Su-27 fighters; the missile is currently produced by the Artem Company, asubsidiary to the state-owned Ukrainian export firm Ukroboronprom.[1] The R-27 series of missilescan generally be categorized by their diameter, 230 mm for the baseline variantand 260 mm for the “energeticheskaya” or energetic variants which feature a largerwarhead, rocket motor, and extended range.[2] All variants have an 8g maneuverabilitylimit and utilize an active radar proximity fuse to activate the missile’s73/86 pound (33 kg/39 kg) continuous rod warhead. The R-27 is comparativelylarger than most medium range BVR AAMs; the “energetic variants” of the R-27have launch weights between 343 kg to 350 kg which is more than twice the weight of the 161 kg AIM-120D. The weight, wingspan of the “butterfly”control surfaces, and 4.5+ meter length of the extended range series of R-27limit external carriage to a maximum of six missiles for the baseline Su-27Flanker and eight missiles for the Su-35.[3][4] Across both the 230 mm and260 mm variants, there are four principal guidance types: semi-active radarhoming (SARH), infrared (IR), passive radio frequency homing (PRFH), and activeradar homing (ARH). Detailed descriptions of each method of guidance are describedin the notes section at the end of the article.

The R-27R/REis the most numerous BVR missile in the VKS inventory and is roughly equivalentto the U.S. AIM-7 Sparrow.[5] The R-27R/RE utilizes aninertial midcourse guidance with radio command updates and a terminal SARHseeker to locate targets. The N135 Irbis is able to illuminate up to twoseparate targets simultaneously to guide SARH missiles.[6]

The baselineR-27R variant has a range of 38 nautical miles (70 km) against approachingnon-maneuvering targets compared to the R-27RE’s 70 nautical miles (130 km)range.[7] The only confirmedinstance in which the R-27R was used in combat was the Ethiopian-Eritrean Warin 1998-2000 which will be discussed after the R-73.

The R-27T/ETseries is visually distinct from all other R-27 variants as a result of its IRseeker in the nose section of the missile. While the R-27T/ET is technically aBVR missile from a maximum kinematic range perspective, in practical terms itis limited to within visual range (WVR) engagements. The missile’s 36T seekermust be locked-on to a target before launch as the R-27T/ET does not featureinertial guidance and cannot receive radio command midcourse updates.[8] The R-27ET features anupgraded seeker which provides greater IR countermeasure discriminationperformance and has a maximum acquisition range of approximately eight nauticalmiles or 15 km.[9]

The R-27P/EPis among the few PRFH AAMs in service. The missile utilizes a passive X-bandPRGS-27 (9B-1032) seeker to detect emitting targets from distances up to 108 nm(200 km) away. However, the missile is still constrained by its limited powersupply and propellant. Thus, the effective maximum kinematic range againstapproaching targets is 60 nautical miles or 110 km.[10] Vympel has marketed theR-27P/EP as capable of engaging airborne early warning and control (AWACS)aircraft, stand-off jammers, and fighter aircraft. The R-27P/EP istheoretically able to provide BVR capabilities without alerting adversary radarwaring receivers (RWR). However, the missile is constrained in that it requiresa cooperative constantly emitting target. The first live fire tests of theR-27P occurred in 1984 and the R-27P entered Soviet Air Force service in 1987. Alimited number of missiles were produced prior to the collapse of the SovietUnion by the Artem plant in Ukraine.

R-27A/AE isan ARH variant of the R-27 family which did not enter production as a result ofthe development of the more advanced R-77.

R-73/AA-11 Archer

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (3)

Image 3: R-60 (left most) and R-73 missiles on display at the National Air and Space Intelligence Center,Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio. Through the “Foreign Materiel Acquisitionand Exploitation Program”, the U.S. Government has acquired everything from RussianMANPADS to complete S-300V and S-300PMUsystems.Image Credit: USAF.

The primaryIR guided missile of the VKS is the R-73 which is fulfills a similar role tothe American AIM-9 Sidewinder. The R-73 is slightly larger than the AIM-9X, theR-73M2 has a diameter of 170 mm, a launch weight of 110 kg, a 8 kg warhead, anda length of 2.9 meters. Like the Sidewinder, the R-73 family of missilescontains more than half a dozen variants which vary in terms of seeker type,fuse, off-boresight capability, and rocket motor. The Molniya OKB (designbureau) began work on the R-73 during the 1970s in Ukraine with the intent ofdeveloping a more maneuverable successor to the R-60/AA-8 Aphid. Responsibilityfor designing the new missile was transferred to Vympel in 1979 and the R-73was first operationally deployed in 1984.[11] The R-73’s capabilitieswere greatly enhanced as a result of the Shchel-3UM helmet mounted sight which enabledoff-boresight shots. U.S. pilots were able to thoroughly examine thecapabilities of the R-73 and Shchel-3UM through a series of exchanges with the GermanAir Force in the 1990s. Lt. Col. Fred "Spanky" Clifton (Ret.), anF-16 pilot who was able to fly the Mig-29 in Germany, explains the Archer andHMS was much more effective than expected:

The Archer and the helmet-mounted sight (HMS) brought a realbig stick to the playground. First, the HMS was really easy to use. Every pilotwas issued his own HMS…Being on the shooting end of the equation, I saw shotopportunities I would've never dreamed of with the AIM-9L/M...In the WVR(within visual range) arena, a skilled MiG-29 pilot can give and Eagle or Viperdriver all he/she wants.[12]

Despite theeffectiveness of the R-73 and HMS, U.S. pilots generally judged the R-27 wassignificantly inferior to the AIM-7 and AIM-120. This conclusion was largelymade evident a few years later in the Eritrean-Ethiopian War between 1998 and2000 described later in the article.

The next majorevolution in the R-73’s design is the R-74M which features an improved range of21.5 nm or 40 km, 60°+ off-boresight capability as well as improved dual-bandImpuls IR seeker with extended detection range and countermeasurediscrimination capabilities. There are two variants of the R-74M, the R-74MLlaser proximity fuse variant and the R-74MK with an active radar fuse.[13] The R-74M entered servicein 2012, but the Impuls seeker is manufactured by the Arsenal company inUkraine meaning Russia’s continued access to new R-74M seekers remains in doubtpost-Crimea. Russia has had to launch numerous domestic industry programs tomitigate the loss of Ukrainian defense imports.

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (4)

Image 4: Russiarecently undertook a domestic development program to replace the Ukrainianproduced Sura-M helmet mounted display for the Mig-29SMT, Su-30SM, and Su-35S.[14]

The latestvariant of the R-73 is the R-74M2 which is analogous to the AIM-9X Block II. TheR-74M2 features a Karfagen-760 IR seeker, more accurate internal guidance,datalink, and an improved rocket motor.[15]

Combat Record R-27 & R-73

In 1998, theEritrean Air Force (ERAF) was supplied with an initial batch of six Mig-29s andat least 36 R-27 and 72 R-73 missiles; Eritrean pilots were trained byUkrainian mercenaries.[16] The Ethiopian Air Force(EtAF) received at least eight Su-27S aircraft, including two Su-27UBKtrainers, as well as 80 R-27 and 96 R-73 missiles from Russia between 1998 and1999. In contrast with the ERAF, the EtAF Su-27s were often flown by Russianpilots.[17][18] Detailed accounts ofaerial engagements during the Eritrean-Ethiopian War are sparse. Tom Cooper andJonathan Kyzer’s article, “Ethiopian Eritrean War, 1998 – 2000”, originallyprinted in AFM Magazine’s August 2000 edition, is one of the fewworks to provide detained information regarding the combat performance of theR-27; an expanded version of the article is available courtesy of the AirCombat Information Group. Cooper and Kyzer describe two major engagementsduring the Eritrean-Ethiopian War in February 1999 and in May 2000 which featurethe use of the R-27 and R-73.

February 1999 Engagement:

…on the morning of 25 Februaryfour MiG-29s were sent to intercept two Su-27s which were patrolling along thefront-lines at Badme. Both Sukhois, flown by Ethiopian pilots, detected theappearance of their opponents in time and attempted to disengage, when - all ofa sudden - they came under an attack byseveral R-27/AA-10 missiles. None of the weapons fired by the Eritreans – whichwere meanwhile inside the Ethiopian airspace – hit, but after evading them,the Ethiopians decided to turn back and fight. The lead, Maj. Workneh, acquired the enemy and fired what was reported as a"salvo" of R-27s, targeting one MiG-29 after the other. However, allthe missiles missed and the only result was that the Eritreans were forcedto break their attack - only to be pounced by the faster Su-27s. The result offollowing dog-fight was one Eritrean MiG-29 shot down, probably by anR-73/AA-11 IR-homing, short range air-to-air missile (fired again by Maj.Workneh).[19][emphasis added]

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (5)

Image 5: Russian Su-27 intercepted by the RAAF, this aircraft is armed with a typical mix of R-73, R-27T, and R-73ER missiles. Image credit: RAF.

May 2000 Engagement:

On 16 May 2000 EritreanAir Force flew couple of counterattacks against the Ethiopian “left hook”,advancing against the western flank of Eritrean positions....at least one MiG-29 was damaged sufficientlyto crash-landed at Asmara, obviously after being damaged by R-27. The ERAFremained stubborn: only two days later, two MiG-29s were scrambled to interceptan incoming formation of EtAF MiG-21s.The leading Eritrean pilot missed with his R-27s, but then shot down atleast one of Ethiopian fighters, using the 30mm gun during a short dogfight.Nevertheless, only minutes later, the same MiG-29 was in turn intercepted by apair of EtAF Su-27s. As the Sukhois engaged, one of them collided with anAfrica Buzzard (a very large bird), and had to return to base after sustainingheavy damage. The other Sukhoi – flown by one of former Derg-pilots –continued, engaging the MiG and shooting it down by a single R-73.[20][emphasis added]

Cooper andKyzer conclude the R-27 likely had a probability kill (PK) less than that ofthe AIM-7E and AIM-7F Sparrow variants utilized in Vietnam which had a PK ofbetween 8-10%.[21]A maximum of 24 R-27 missiles were fired throughout the war–which were likelythe R-27R variant, but only one R-27 managed to maneuver close enough to itsintended target such that its radar proximity fuse to activated. In contrast,the R-73 proved itself as a lethal WVR missile; a total of nine missiles were launchedresulting in five aerial victories or a PK of 55%.[22] As Cooper and Kyzerexplain, the majority of engagements between EtAF Su-27s and ERAF Mig-29s occurredwithin visual range. Curiously, the Mig-29 – which is often regarded as havingsuperb maneuverability characteristics – performed poorly against the largerSu-27. It’s possible the disparity in aerial victories between the ERAF andEtAF is attributable more towards training and personnel quality issues ratherthan hardware. It is unclear to the extent, if at all, the engagements betweenthe ERAF and EtAF influenced Russian defense developments in the late 1990s to early2000s.

After thepoor performance of the AIM-7 in Vietnam, the U.S. made significant investmentsin upgrading the AIM-7 between 1970 into the 1980s such as greater jamresistance, look-down shoot-down capability, improved rocket motor, etc.[23] However, it is generallyunderstood that the Russian defense industry received little in terms ofresearch and development funding during the 1990s and early 2000s as a resultof Russia’s financial difficulties; many new projects had to be sustained byexport orders. Therefore, it is unclear to the extent in which Vympel tried torectify the R-27’s shortcomings through upgrades or design changes to newmissile orders. It is also unclear if the engagements during the Eritrean-EthiopianWar had impact on Russian conceptions of ideal fighter characteristics, e.g.such as emphasis on WVR maneuvering. The combination of continued investmentsin the R-73 while the development of the R-27’s successor, the R-77, laggedsuggests the Russian Air Force weighed WVR capabilities as a higher priority.


AAMGuidance Notes

  • SARH guidance is the process in which the launch platformilluminates a target with its radar and the missile’s onboard receiver detectsthe reflected radar energy. By comparing the reflected beam’s characteristicsto its source, the missile is able to determine the targets position and speed.[24] In order to properlyfunction, SARH guidance requires the launch platform’s radar to continuouslytrack and illuminate the target–which imposes limitations on the launchplatform’s freedom to maneuver–and missile’s receiver must continuously detectthe reflected radar energy. Furthermore, SARH requires the launch platform’sradar to continuously emit signals thereby exposing the launch platform toradar warning receivers (RWR) and other emission location systems.[25] However, SARH providessubstantial BVR capabilities when compared to IR guided missiles.
  • IR guided missiles do not emit signals, rather they home inon heat sources (infrared radiation) such as jet engines. In order tosuccessfully intercept the target, IR seekers must discriminate againstbackground IR radiation sources and IR countermeasures. The first IR guidedmissiles could only be fired against tail-aspect targets as a result of seekerlimitations. Subsequent generations of IR guided missiles such as the AIM-9Lare all-aspect capable. The principal limitation of IR guided missiles is thelimited detection range of their seekers. The latest generation of IR guidedmissiles such as the AIM-9X Block II feature lock-on after launch (LOAL)capability.
  • PRFH missiles similarly do not emit signals, but home in onRF emitting targets.
  • ARH missiles have their own radar seekers which activateduring the terminal stage of flight. ARH guided missiles enable “fire andforget” capability i.e. the pilot has freedom to maneuver after initiallydesignated the target with the plane’s radar. By having its own seeker (often amonopulse X-band seeker), ARH missiles are inherently less susceptible tocertain forms of jamming.


Author’sNote: I’m still planning on writing that article with 12Raptors vs 48 Su-35s. There are far more variables than I had anticipated soI’m still researching a couple of topics like Russian air defense doctrines, electronicwarfare, “jointness” between the various armed services, battle management networks,datalinks (which are very hard to research) as well as basic fightermaneuvering tactics. As such I’ll probably write an article or two on thetopics above for my own edification. Below is a teaser to show some of theassets which will show up in the backstory and simulation:

Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (6)

Note that the 790thfighter regiments do not operate the Su-35S at this time. Only the 22ndand 23rd fighter regiments operate the Su-35S in large numbers (the 159th just received there first four aircraft in November 2016), but more deliveries will take place between 2016 and 2020. A typicalsquadron of fighter aircraft in the VKS consists of at least 12 aircraft.

WorksConsulted

George M. Siouris,Missile Guidance and Control Systems, Springer-Verlag New York, 2004.

Jeffrey T Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Westview Press, Jul 14, 2015.

Piotr Butowski, “Russian Air Power Almanac 2015”,Air Force Magazine, 2015.http://www.airforcemag.com/MagazineArchive/Magazine%20Documents/2015/July%202015/0715russia.pdf

Sebastien Roblin, "Russia's MiG-29 Fulcrum: A Super Fighter or Super Failure?", July 2016.http://nationalinterest.org/feature/russias-mig-29-fulcrum-super-fighter-or-super-failure-17054

Tactical Missile Corporation, “Products”, lastaccessed November 2016. http://eng.ktrv.ru/production_eng/


[1] Artem Company, “R-27 missiles”,last accessed November 2016.

[2] Vympel offers R-27EP anti-radarair-to-air missile Piotr Butowski

[3] Artem Company, “R-27 missiles”,last accessed November 2016.

[4] Piotr Butowski, “The FlankerFamily Part Two: Upgrades, Su-33 and Su-35”, Combat Aircraft September 2016 Issue, pgs. 61-66.

[5] Sukhoi Products: Su-35 multi-rolefighter, last access October 2016. http://www.sukhoi.org/eng/planes/military/Su-35/

[6] Piotr Butowski, “The FlankerFamily Part Two: Upgrades, Su-33 and Su-35”, Combat Aircraft September 2016 Issue, pgs. 61-66.

[7] Global Security, “AA-10 ALAMO R-27”,last updated November 2011. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/aa-10-specs.htm

[8] Jane’s, “Russian Air-LaunchedWeapons 38”, 2001.

[10] Piotr Butowski, “Vympel offersR-27EP anti-radar air-to-air missile”, 2007.

[12] Tyler Rogoway, “How To Win In ADogfight: Stories From A Pilot Who Flew F-16s And MiGs”, 2015. http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/how-to-win-in-a-dogfight-stories-from-a-pilot-who-flew-1682723379

[13] PiotrButowski, Jane's International Defense Review, August 2014.

[14] BMPD/ CAST, “Helmet-mounted targetdesignation system NSTS-T for Russian fighter jets”, November 2016. http://bmpd.livejournal.com/2200980.html

[15] Piotr Butowski, Jane'sInternational Defense Review, August 2014.

[16] Pieter D. Wezeman “United NationsArms Embargoes Their Impact on Arms Flows and Target Behavior Case study: Eritreaand Ethiopia, 2000–2001.” http://books.sipri.org/files/misc/UNAE/SIPRI07UNAEE-E.pdf

[17] Ibid.

[18] Jonathan Kyzer, et al., Air CombatInformation Group, “Air War between Ethiopia and Eritrea, 1998-2000”,2003. http://www.acig.info/CMS/?option=com_content&task=view&id=138&Itemid=47

[19] Ibid.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[23] F-16.net, “AIM-7 Sparrow”, lastaccessed November 2016. http://www.f-16.net/f-16_armament_article10.html

[24] Robert L. Shaw, Fight CombatTactics and Maneuvering, pp. 38

[25] Robert L. Shaw, Fight CombatTactics and Maneuvering, pp. 38


Threat Analysis: Su-35S Part II - Armament R-27 & R-73 (2025)

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